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Abstract
This thesis presents a technique to determine whether a user is actively interacting with
a device from inside the network. By the observation of user’s traffic, network operators can
use the detection method to improve traffic management by prioritizing user facing flows.
Understanding whether a user is using a device from inside the network requires separat-
ing user generated traffic from the one that is automatically generated by a machine in the
background. To accomplish this, we apply three filtering methods, looking at request URLs
and at the inter events distance and periodicity. Using real world data from eight devices in
the UK collected with a tool capable of recording not only network traffic, but also user input,
we show how our method separates the traffic generated by the user.
1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a drastic popularization of access to Internet applications and services.
Accessing the Internet from a computer or a smartphone has become a routine task for most people
and interactions with these devices can vary from very short bursts of usage to long online sessions.
Moreover, the list of connected devices that populate our households is ever growing. While the
amount of data that traverses our home networks keeps increasing every day, only a subset of it
can be associated with a user directly interacting with online services.
Understanding whether it is possible to isolate and infer user online presence within the network
is useful in many fields. From a security standpoint, the detection of user online presence could
constitute a serious threat, where malicious attackers might exploit this information to understand
when users are at home. On the other end, detecting user presence can be extremely valuable to
network administrators in two main fields: performance optimization and network diagnosis and
maintenance. If capable of detecting which packets correspond to the current user-facing activity,
network administrators could instrument routers in homes to prioritize the subsets of traffic most
affecting the user experience. Moreover, if the administrator detects any problem affecting the
proper functioning of the network, he can prioritize solving the problems associated with an active
user, who is currently online.
This thesis analyzes how to detect which packets in a stream of packets traversing a router
originate from user-facing application. We define user-facing traffic as network traffic generated
by the user, by accessing a website, streaming a movie, or listening to music, for instance. The
core challenge of detecting user-facing traffic is to be able to differentiate user online activity from
background traffic activity. In fact, many applications run on a user’s device but on the background
without user intervention, so only a fraction of the packets from an individual’s device correspond
to data generated by the user herself.
We create a method that takes as input a stream of network packets and identifies the subsets
that corresponds to the user-facing traffic. In order to do that, we develop filters that run in
real time. The groups of packets towards a given destination will then be filtered out by three
different methods in sequence: (i) removal of all packets to/from hosts in a pre-defined blacklist,
(ii) elimination of packets with inter-arrival times of less than a second and for last (iii) elimination
of packets whose intervals are too constant (meaning the same interval is repeated many times)
and so, have a high probability of being generated automatically by a website or software.
We develop and evaluate our method based on two months of data collected from a total of
eight participants from the UK in 2015 and 2016. The study monitored participants and stored
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information related to their network traffic such as network flows, DNS and HTTP requests and
location of usage, along with information related to user device interaction, such as mouse and
keyboard clicks and information about screen state of applications (fullscreen or idle). More
specifically, from the data obtained, we analyze HTTP and DNS requests and filter out any packets
that are not produced directly by the user, equivalent to background activity. The choice of
using HTTP and DNS requests comes from the fact that this was the data less affected by noise
during collection, other datasets had many missing packets. Using data such as applications on
fullscreen mode and mouse clicks, we are able to infer user presence, meaning we can assume by
this information that the user is currently interacting with the device or generated an action that
is currently producing packets (such as watching a movie). From user presence, we extract user
absence, which are the periods of time when the user is not interacting with the device. We use user
absence as ground truth for our filtering algorithm. Periods of user presence mix user-facing and
background packets and so, we cannot get ground truth. For this reason, we utilize user absence
periods. By doing this, we are able to evaluate the efficiency of the filtering process.
The main contributions of this thesis are defining the problem scope based on the definition
of user-facing and background packets and developing an algorithm to label each network packet
based on this definition.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the problem statement. Sec-
tion 3 describes the datasets used, along with explanations on the differences between individual
devices data available. Section 4 focuses on how we obtained ground truth to evaluate our algo-
rithm. This is followed by section 5, which describes how user absence is detected from the network,
by explaining the filtering methods used and the reason for picking them. Section 6 analyses the
efficiency of each of the filtering methods for different users. Finally, section 7 explains related
work and section 8 concludes presenting future work and final comments.
2 Problem Definition
Our goal is to determine for each packet whether it comes from an user-facing application. By
this, we mean to distinguish when the user is directly using an application and the application
is generating traffic versus traffic generated automatically on the background. When streaming
videos or music, it is not guaranteed that the user will be watching or listening to the music at the
time, but we infer that high chances are that he is. This way, we define as user-facing traffic the
network packets that have been generated by previous or current user action. We take as input a
stream of packets traversing a router and output user-facing packets marked with a flag.
Background activity consists of data resultant from background applications running on devices
and generating online traffic (such as a software updates or websites refreshing their pages, for
instance), without direct manual request from the user. Making sure these two different types of
packets (user generated and background activity) are identified is key to our study, because only
the user generated ones indicate real user online presence.
Differentiating user-facing from background packets by solely monitoring network traffic is not
an easy task. Many applications may run in parallel and, additionally, there are cases where the
same application may run on the background or with the user. For example, Skype can generate
user-facing packets if a user is making a call or generate background packets if the software is
updating or checking the quality of connection. Another example are news websites, like the New
York Times, that refreshes the webpage from time to time, without user request. Identifying these
nuances are one of the main challenges of this thesis.
3 Dataset
We take an empirical approach to develop our filtering method. We evaluate packets collected
from users’ devices. Data collection was conducted with Hostview, a tool developed by Inria.
Hostview is an end-host monitoring tool that runs constantly on the background, and collects
various system configuration, status and performance metrics. Some of these metrics are event
triggered such as network connectivity changes (network interface goes up or down), system power
states (screen state, battery charge state), and user presence (user device interaction, such as mouse
and keyboard clicks, and foreground application). Other metrics are polled periodically including
wireless network statistics, the set of running applications, IO activity and active sockets. In
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addition, Hostview captures packet traces of all network traffic (first 100 bytes) using libpcap.
Hostview captures the TCP/IP headers of all traffic, part of the HTTP header and full DNS
packets. The information collected from the HTTP headers includes the request host, method and
response status, the request path, the content type and length and, finally, the request referrer.
When the user receives or sends a packet Hostview looks at the header and if it is a DNS or HTTP
packet it logs it. Using Hostview is appealing because it provides data such as the network packet
traces and extra data from the device, such as which applications are on fullscreen mode and user
mouse clicks.
Hostview collected different datasets. Our analysis of the data showed some issues on the
collection of some of these. For instance, flows and sockets datasets had missing information for
many users on many days, meaning that packets that could be seen on the DNS and HTTP datasets
didn’t have any equivalent packets on the flows and sockets datasets. Moreover, other data as the
traffic being generated by the device, was accurate for certain users only in a few days and missing
for others. The two datasets related to network traffic that appeared to be the most complete
were the ones containing DNS and HTTP requests. For this reason, the rest of this thesis focuses
these two datasets, which were used to determine user facing presence. Our methods are valid for
packets streams more broadly and our goal is to re-run the analysis after the new deployment of
Hostview.
Inria and the University of Nottingham conducted the studies that gathered the data with
Hostview. The first part of the study happened in France, with 12 participants. The second phase
gathered data from users from the UK, with a total of 14 individuals. Data collected included
both PCs and mobile devices. The necessary information to generate ground truth and test our
algorithm was only available for a subset of these users, though. For this reason we focus on eight
devices, Windows PCs and Windows laptops, of different participants in the United Kingdom.
Some devices belonged to more than one person in the same family. For instance, one device was
shared by husband and wife.
The amount of data available for analysis from each device differs. The quantity of days with
available traffic information varied per device; some having only 4 days available and others having
up to 15 days. Some users had packets every day, while others had periods of no usage or were
not monitored. As it can be observed in other studies that also deal with collection of user data
[1]. Some users provided a lot of data continuously, throughout the two months, while others have
long periods of inactivity. Day long measurements mean that many times the device connected
to the Internet from different locations, resulting on different network environments. There are
devices, for instance, with very few HTTP requests, while others provide more than 200,000 URLs
accessed. This type of disparity extends to other data types, like DNS requests. Sockets were not
available for seven out of the eight devices used. Moreover, for the one that contained sockets data,
on many days it was not accurate or simply didn’t exist. The flows and device traffic datasets also
presented problems. The analysis in this thesis helped uncover a number of issues with the data
which are now being fixed for the new version of Hostview.
4 Ground Truth
User absence are the periods of time when the user is not interacting with the device. It is the
opposite of user presence, which includes activities such as web browsing, playing online and offline
games or editing documents. User absence represents the ground truth in our study and is used
to evaluate our filtering method. Having user absence as ground truth means that we affirm with
100% accuracy that the user was not interacting with the device at a determined time.
In order to obtain user absence, we first had to obtain user presence sessions. A session is
defined as an interval of time on which the user has uninterruptedly interacted with the device.
Data necessary to determine user absence is provided by Hostview. We get the data in two phases:
1. By extracting the exact time participants manipulated mouse, keyboard, microphone and
speakers, and by applications running on full screen mode on the user’s devices.
2. By creating user presence sessions with this data.
We had to transform information collected from mouse, keyboard, speaker and microphone
usage into sessions, which correspond to an interval of time. Many mouse clicks close to each
other, for instance, integrated the same session. The key point was to determine how far apart a
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Figure 1: Cumulative fraction of consecutive requests of Avast inter packet times.
click should be to be considered part of a new session. Based on a previous study [2] that evaluated
mouse and keyboard inter-event times, we observed that most of these interactions are no more
than 150 seconds apart. Utilizing this information, mouse, keyboard, speakers and microphone
packets were grouped together when they were less than 150 seconds apart from each other. The
information regarding the state of the application screen was already provided into intervals of time
and only needed to be connected to the created sessions if they were no more than 150 seconds
apart.
5 Detection of user-facing traffic
This section describes the algorithm used to detect user-facing traffic. The algorithm is divided into
three main smaller algorithms, each of them responsible for analyzing a given packet and labeling
it. The method works as a decision tree, where each of the smaller algorithms is a decision node.
If the first node is not able to label the packet, it will send it to the next node. Our algorithm to
identify if a packet is user-facing or background is unsupervised. It receives a stream of packets in
real time and as output, classifies each of them as user-facing or background.
By analyzing the Cumulative Fraction of Consecutive Requests (CFCR) for inter packet time
per URL we observed patterns and inter packet times that repeated at same periodicity. In most
of them we noticed many inter packet times of less than a second and also, in some cases, a big
number of inter packets of the same length. We assume that packets related to an inter packet
time of less than a second are all either background or user-facing depending on the first packet
that generated the burst. Background related packets should be filtered out. Also, a packet whose
interval to the next one is very periodic should be filtered out. The reason for that we will be
further explained when we talk about the short intervals filtering method and the periodic intervals
filtering method.
One example to illustrate the behavior described is on Figure 1. It refers to Avast, an anti-virus
software, that can be manipulated by an individual, but also runs on the background, when doing
software updates or scans. The plot clearly shows that a number of requests happen in less than
a second from each other. We can also observe a line that seems almost vertical around the five
minutes measure. This line corresponds to a periodic interval.
We also compared the CFCRs of specific URLs to the interval times where users were known
to be absent to characterize if the background traffic occurred solely on periods of inactivity. The
results, as expected, still showed periodicity when users were present, but were accentuated on
intervals where the user was not.
Our algorithm uses three filters, which work as decision nodes on a decision three and will label
the packets, like illustrated on Figure 2. In this figure, the gray square represents the input: a
packet. Each of the nodes represent one of the filters used: blacklist, short inter packet intervals
and periodic intervals. If the first filter, blacklist, is able to identify the packet as background, it
labels it that way (represented by the red square), otherwise the packet is analyzed by the next
filter. This process persists until the packet is labeled. In the image, blue squares represent the
user-facing labeled packets.
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Figure 2: Decision tree with each filter.
5.1 Blacklist filter
By plotting the histogram with all the URLs accessed by the users we observed that many of them
were related to background URLs, like the ones associated to software updates. Some softwares
might generate a lot of background traffic, like Skype, which is constantly testing whether the
user is online and getting which of the user’s friends are online. Based on these observations, the
first filter consists of a blacklist with URLs related to background traffic. We utilize as blacklist
a list obtained online. Even though it is not complete, it is still an important and fast method of
filtering, by the fact that is consists of a simple URL association.
5.2 Periodic intervals filter
The observation of CFCRs showed vertical lines, associated with periodic intervals. These periodic
intervals are characterized most probably by a software generating updates. Updates tend to
happen in constant intervals of time. User behavior is never that precise. For instance, a user will
not make requests every 30 seconds, it will vary.
The periodic intervals filter evaluates if a packet is part of background activity or not by
determining if such packet is part of a periodic interval. This is determined partially by the
theoretic count.
theoretic counts = session lengthperiodicity
The theoretic count depends on two variables: the session length and the periodicity. A session
is an interval in time made from DNS or HTTP domain packets that are up to a certain time gap
apart from each other.
The periodicity is an interval length in seconds. For each session, we calculated the intervals
that appeared and the number of times each of them was repeated. For sessions with less than 5
packets, we calculated periodicity if a certain interval length was repeated on more than 50% of the
session. For sessions with at least 5 packets, if identified interval lengths equivalent to over 30% of
the intervals in a session we calculated theoretic counts. The theoretic count was then compared
to the real count - number of times the interval actually appeared in the whole session. If the two
values were close, given a small error window margin, the whole session was deleted. Otherwise,
just the spike, equivalent to a certain part of that session would be erased. If the analyzed packet
is part of the deleted session, it means it it related to background activity.
5.3 Short intervals filter
As explained when analyzing the CFCRs of inter packet times, we noticed intervals smaller than
one second. We consider packets associated with these intervals as part of the same group, meaning
that they should be labeled the same. The behavior that characterizes such short intervals comes
from an action that triggers many events. As previously explained, when the user accesses a
website, his first request will generate many others. These generated requests will be very close in
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time from the first one (less than a second). This behavior might also be generated by background
activity. This is why when we identify a burst of short intervals, the classification of the first packet
will determine the classification of the other ones.
5.4 Detection algorithm
We classify the filters in two main groups: background filter (blacklist and periodic intervals) and
event aggregation (short intervals). Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 present the pseudo code for the detection
algorithm, with each filter explained.
Algorithm 1 Detection method
function Identify packet(observedPacket, packets, blacklist)
2: if observedPacket in blacklist then
return False
4: . packets contain all packets with the same url as the observed packet in the last interval
of five minutes from the observed packet
previousPacket← packets[len(packets)-2]
6: interPacketT ime← observedPacket− previousPacket
if interPacket <1 and previousPacket is background then
8: return False
else if interPacket <1 and previousPacket is userFacing then
10: return True
onlineActivity ← eliminateConstantIntervals((block1sec[url]))
12: if observedPacket not in onlineActivity then
return False
14: return True
Algorithm 2 Constant interval elimination method
function eliminateConstantIntervals(packets)
invDist← getIntervalDistribution((packets))
3: for inv in invDist do
if ( invDist[inv]invDist[total] ≥ .5 and invDist[total] ≤ 5) or (
invDist[inv]
invDist[total] ≥ .3 and
invDist[total] ≥ 5) then
realCount← invDist[inv]
6: theoCount← sessionLength
inv
if theoCount ≤ 10 then
errorMargin← .2
9: else if theoCount ≥ 10 and theoCount ≤ 100 then
errorMargin← .15
else
12: errorMargin← .1
if realCount ≥ (theoCount− theoCount ∗ errorMargin) then
eliminate whole interval
15: else
eliminate spike
return filtered packets
6 Evaluation
In order to evaluate the algorithm we compared the efficiency of the filtering methods on user
absence periods. Considering we had ground truth for the intervals of time the user was not present,
we could identify the packets that were generated by background activity: packets generated on user
absence periods. We then checked if we could label these packets as background when applying
the filtering methods. We plotted the Cumulative Fraction of Intervals (CFI) for four different
6
Algorithm 3 Interval distribution method
function GetIntervalDistribution(packet)
for packet in packets do
interEvent← next packet− current packet
4: invDist[interEvent]← invDist[interEvent] + 1
invDist[total]← invDist[total] + 1
return invDist
Figure 3: Cumulative fraction of intervals for all users.
combinations: non filtered packets, blacklist filtered packets, interval filtered packets (combination
of short and periodic interval filters) and filtered (all methods together). These results are available
on Figure 3. They show the distribution of intervals containing a certain number of packets. Perfect
results would present all intervals with zero packets.
We can observe that all filtering methods show improvement when compared to non filtered
packets. This improvement, though, is still not a good result. When analyzing in more detail
packets that were not filtered, they most times corresponded to URLs of short intervals, which
didn’t give us enough precision to eliminate them on the periodic filtering. Making this filter more
aggressive, by allowing a bigger error margin between theoretic counts and real counts, in order to
eliminate whole sessions instead of partial intervals could be a solution to improve that.
Besides the CFI, which was referent to all devices combined, we analyzed each result separately
using a table containing the number of remaining packets after each filtering (Figure 4) along with
the percentage of filtered packets it represents (Figure 5).
The blacklist filter was more efficient than the intervals one in most cases. We concluded that
using this filter, though, is not a good option. We found the pre-made blacklist online and it is
assumed that it is impossible that it contains all possible background related URLs. Moreover, it
includes URLs related to advertisements, which not necessarily are background generated. Another
issue is that the list is static, meaning is doesn’t increase in size by adding new identified URLs
and makes it a limited method. The fact that the list doesn’t change, also makes the elimination
of packets very specific for each user. For instance, if two devices happened to request the same
number of URL background packets, but only the ones for the first device are present on the
Figure 4: Filtered packets per device on absence periods.
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Figure 5: Percentage of filtered packets per device on absence periods.
blacklist, the results of this method will vary from 100% to 0% precision. When further analyzing
this result, though, we concluded that the blacklist is not an appropriate filtering method. Most
websites that generate blacklist, include on their lists URLs related to advertisements as said,
which could be user generated. This is a very tricky characterization because these URLs can be
generated by the user fetching a web page (user-facing packet) or by a website refreshing the page
without user intervention (background packet).
The filtering by intervals showed really poor results, with the best one being 42% of packets
filtered on device 2. We think that making the periodicity filter more aggressive would results in
a great improvement in these results.
Finally, the method that combined all filters was the best on every device, as expected. In
many cases, the performance of the filtered method is only slightly better than the background
one, meaning that a combination of the three filtering methods was not as effective as expected.
7 Related work
Analyzing user traffic has been an area of common interest for many researchers and a variety of
methods to extract the data and fetch relevant information can be found. These studies focus on
traffic at large without distinction between user traffic and background traffic [3] [1]. Many studies
on device and user behavior focus on device performance, energy consumption or identifying user
daily patterns, such as distribution of usage during the day or routines of app usage, and are based
solely on mobile devices [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]. None of the previous studies capture user presence.
For energy consumption, for instance, being able to evaluate how user generated and background
traffic differently affect battery performance could help on designing algorithms to decrease energy
consumption. Different methods could be applied when it is known that the user is not present.
Many of these optimizations should also not be a one size fits all solution: users interact differently
with their devices, accessing different types of websites and softwares that might be more or less
demanding [1] and as so, need to be correctly analyzed in order for the best solution to be provided.
Moreover, even the studies that make analyzes based on background and user facing traffic [8]
generate these two types of traffic from controlled experiments and simulations, and not from real
traffic. This gives them a notion of these two types of the data without the need to identify each
of them, but could not be applied to real users, exactly by the fact that they wouldn’t be able
to differentiate background from user facing traffic. Even though this type of experiments can be
precise, they still don’t fully represent data fetch from a real person. Additionally, some other
studies, despite using a big group of users, are based only on the observation of mobile phones’
usage[9] [4]. This restricts the generalization of results. Mobile phones might be the most popular
among users, but tablets and laptops are also part of users daily lives and should be studied as
well. This is an issue that is also present in our study but that can be solved with the future data
fetched by Hostview, which is still being improved and used.
8 Conclusion and future work
The main difficulty on this work was correctly formalizing the problem to be answered with the
available data. Before deciding to evaluate user-facing packets, the main focus was to analyze the
periods of time a user was present. Trying to find solutions for the lack of data, such as the flows
8
datasets and trying to create ground truth from the data were hard challenges. The main barrier
of not being able to differentiate background online applications from the user-facing ones on the
user activities dataset led to a reformulation of the problem, where the focus became user absence
periods.
The method provided still has a lot of room for improvement. We didn’t have time to evaluate
it in depth, which means we applied no ameliorations for the filters. As we mentioned, one possible
solution for bad results could be being more strict with the periodic intervals filter. Future work
should focus on determining the precise limits of obtaining the best out of the periodic filtering.
We could make it more or less aggressive by determining the quantity of period repetitions that
should be filtered, or the rate that repetitions should appear in a session in order to filter the
whole session out. If it was possible to obtain user presence ground truth, it would be interesting
to adapt the aggressiveness of this method. Making it too strong could end up wrongly detecting
user-facing packets as background ones.
Another future approach for ameliorating the final method could be done by introducing new
types of filtering. A promising example is using a collaborative blacklist. This would be a blacklist
created by URLs filtered on the periodic intervals. This is an interesting solution because there is
a huge number of URLs that are related to background activity and determining and adding all
of them manually to a list is nearly impossible and a very time consuming task. We could further
analyze if the URLs detected by the periodic filters were all related to software updates, which
would give us a valid blacklist. The collaborative blacklist guarantees that any URL identified as
background activity for one user, will be filtered for the other ones as well. It can be adapted
depending on the group of users and the results and would fit on cases where the URL intervals
are not long enough for identifying periodic intervals.
Moreover, besides the datasets available with user information, each participant on the study
was interviewed, commenting on their network habits and routines. Trying to map the results
containing their daily usage and trying to further reflect how much can be inferred from their real
routines by just analyzing the plots is also interesting.
In order to obtain more general results, analyzing not only windows laptop and PC users, but
mobile devices running on different operational systems is also relevant. Results would be richer,
even though, they are expected to be as precise as the ones from windows users. We would need
to run a new study collecting the necessary type of data from the various devices, but since the
Hostview study is on going, plans are that new data will be tested and new results achieved. With
these results the filters will be able to be properly optimized. It would be interesting to have users
from different countries as well, since after determining user-facing packets, their daily habits and
daily usage times could also be analyzed.
Analyzing user traces can provide relevant information on many fields of user analysis, such as
energy consumption, user daily routines and application usage. This work only starts exploring the
possibilities of extracting user data, but shows that determining user online presence by network
traces can be an interesting and promising field of research.
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